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1 Reshaping metaphysical realism: The case
of quantum mechanics
Scientific realism is the view that science, and physics in particular, tells
us a fairly accurate story about reality. Hence, a precise characterization of
scientific realism should spell out how scientific theories relate to the natu-
ral world. A standard definition of scientific realism, such as that given in
Chakravartty (2017, section 1.2), characterizes this view as the union of three
different components (or theses). The first is dubbed epistemic and amounts
to the claim that scientific theories provide us with knowledge about how
the world is. The second is the semantic thesis, which amounts to taking
scientific claims at face value, that is, scientific claims are statements about
facts obtaining in the world. Finally, there is the metaphysical component,
which deals with what it is for the just mentioned scientific claims to be true.
Otherwise said, the metaphysical component deals with what the ontology of
the world is according to scientific theories. Here we will focus on this third
component (see also Horwich, 1982 for a discussion of all three theses).
In general, metaphysical realism is the view that there are “things” which
exist independently of any mind that might perceive them. Here we use
the word “thing” as a placeholder that can be replaced with more precise
designations, depending on one’s own ontological tastes. Think of material
bodies, abstract objects, facts, events, space, time, patterns or other less
intuitive entities: all of these things can be part of this mind-independent
reality. Although with a varying terminology, there is a general consensus in
the literature to broadly characterize metaphysical realism in such a way; for
example Magnus (2012, p. 19) calls it “deep realism”, while for Miller (2019)
it is “generic realism”. Clearly, a scientific realist holds the firm belief that
science can and should help in clarifying and sharpening the metaphysical
realist thesis. The present paper will indeed be concerned with the impact
that modern physics has on the notion of metaphysical realism.
In order to clarify and sharpen the metaphysical realist thesis qua com-
ponent of scientific realism, we can start by considering classical mechanics.
In this context, the values of the dynamical variables that describe a system
have a definite value at any point in time. Furthermore there is a unique
physically relevant description of any system, which is the one that can be
attained by observers moving inertially. This characterization of classical
mechanics—distilled from the contemporary textbook presentations of the
topic—seems to force at least two minimal constraints on reality. We will
call these requirements definiteness and objectivity.
The requirement of definiteness roughly means that all things possess a
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definite mode of being. For example, if a material object possesses a certain
property, such a property has to be definite (or determinate). A colored
balloon cannot be just colored, it has to have some definite color, say, red.
Of course, the balloon might not have been red earlier (it might have been
painted red just a moment ago), but even at that point it must have possessed
some determinate color.
The requirement of objectivity, instead, states that for any thing, its
mode of being is unique. A thing cannot be, say, a red balloon and a black
horse. A thing might perhaps appear differently if perceived under different
conditions but, from a purely ontological point of view, the thing is in a
unique way. This is not to say that a thing cannot be ontologically parasitic
on other things—one might argue that a balloon can be reduced to a bunch
of polymers holding up a bunch of helium atoms. Rather, this means that the
way such a thing is—including how it is possibly made up of other things—
has no ontological ambiguity. Two remarks are in order at this point. First,
objectivity as we cast it is primarily a metaphysical notion, rather than
an epistemic or a semantic one. Certainly, the notion does have epistemic
and semantic counterparts, especially in the scientific realist context (e.g.
scientific knowledge is objective in that it is knowledge of the world as is).
However, what we will call objectivity throughout the text is an attribute
of reality simpliciter : it concerns the way things are. Second, this notion
of objectivity plays a pivotal role in standard scientific realism because it
helps accounting for the explanatory power of scientific theories (see Reiss
and Sprenger, 2020, for an overview on the topic of scientific objectivity).
We define the above metaphysical characterization of reality as standard
realism. Note that standard realism as we defined it says nothing about what
particular things inhabit the world and how they behave. For this reason,
it is not to be confused with the brand of “commonsensical” metaphysical
theorizing attacked in Ladyman and Ross (2007, cf. for example section 1.2).
What Ladyman and Ross attack is the excessive reliance on intuitions and/or
outdated physics in shaping the ontology of the physical world, which then
results in the attempt at shoehorning a fundamental picture of “microbang-
ings” between “little things” into modern physics. However, these authors are
in favor of adopting definiteness and objectivity in the metaphysical inquiry,
as their declaration of intent makes clear:
[W]e will articulate a theory of what it is for a scientific theory to
be taken to describe a part of objective reality—a ‘real pattern’,
as we will say [...]
(ibid, p. 36, emphasis added).
An obvious consequence of standard realism as we characterize it is that
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reality, i.e. the way all existing things are, is metaphysically coherent. This
means that reality cannot be decomposed into mutually inconsistent pictures:
all these pictures must seamlessly blend to form a consistent whole. Other-
wise said, according to standard realism there is an “outside world” whose
ontological unity is warranted by the existence of definite and objective facts.
At this point a pressing question presents itself: is standard realism,
intended as the metaphysical component of scientific realism, still tenable
under the light of quantum mechanics? The question is pressing because
quantum mechanics is one of the most empirically corroborated theories we
have so far, so it is fair to ask how the world is according to this framework.
By “quantum mechanics” we mean the formalism presented and discussed
in the standard textbooks on the subject, such as Cohen-Tannoudji et al.
(1977) and Sakurai (1994). This theoretical framework relies on a number
of basic postulates revolving around the measurement procedure of quantum
systems. In a nutshell, the physical state of a system is completely repre-
sented by a state vector (or a wave function) in the Hilbert space.1 The wave
function’s dynamics is described by the unitary and linear Schrödinger equa-
tion. In particular, the linearity of the Schrödinger equation implies that any
linear superposition of its solutions is also a solution. The physical properties
of a quantum system are called observables and mathematically represented
by Hermitian operators defined on the system’s Hilbert space. The numeri-
cal values of these physical magnitudes are the eigenvalues of such operators.
When a measurement is performed on a system being in a superposition of
eigenstates of the measured observable, the state suddenly “collapses” in one
of such eigenstates with a probability given by the so-called Born’s rule.
Quantum states are radically different from classical ones. According
to the formalism of quantum mechanics, they can be in a superposition of
different and mutually incompatible states (at least, until a measurement
is performed on the system). Furthermore, the values of the observables
associated to non-commuting operators (e.g., two operators Â and B̂ for
which ÂB̂ 6= B̂Â) are sensitive to the measurement order. For example, if
we perform a measurement of the spin components of an electron first in
the x-direction and then in the z-direction, the final results will be different
from what we would have obtained if we performed a measurement in the
z-direction first and then in the x-direction. This is clearly in stark contrast
with the classical picture of the electron possessing a definite value of the
spin in both directions at the same time. Already at this stage, it seems that
quantum mechanics breaks with standard realism and, in particular, with
1Throughout the text we will use the terms “quantum state”, “state vector”, and “wave
function” interchangeably, since blurring their distinction does not affect our discussion.
4
the requirement of ontic definiteness. Indeed, some of the founding fathers
of quantum mechanics, such as Niels Bohr, took this for granted (see Dieks,
2017, for a critical discussion of Bohr’s views on quantum mechanics, also
in relation to modern takes on the problem of interpreting the formalism of
this theory). In Bohr’s words:
In [the context of quantum mechanics], even the old question
of an ultimate determinacy of natural phenomena has lost its
conceptional basis [...]
(Bohr, 1948, p. 317)
On this basis, even modern metaphysicians may defend the claim that a
scientifically informed doctrine of metaphysical realism has to let go of the
requirement of definiteness (see e.g., Calosi and Mariani, 2021 for a recent
review of quantum indeterminacy).
However, this plain reading of the quantum formalism raises some major
conceptual questions. Most notably, one may ask why any quantum mea-
surement always select just one definite outcome out of the many possible
outcomes of a coherent superposition. According to quantum mechanics, the
answer is given by the collapse postulate: every time a system undergoes a
measurement procedure, the state vector collapses into one of the eigenstates
of the measured observable. However, this is not a satisfactory answer for
the simple reason that the theory is silent about which sort of interactions
must be described as “measurements” (and hence described by the collapse)
and which as normal physical interactions between systems (described by
Schrödinger’s dynamics). In the absence of a precise criterion to discrimi-
nate between the two, the choice is usually left to practical considerations,
which is sufficient for experimental purposes, not for philosophical ones. This
is, in a nutshell, the famous measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
Clearly, for a scientific realist, quantum mechanics is not just a theory
about measurements, it is a theory about the physical world. Hence, from
a realist point of view, the measurement problem is an issue concerning the
physical world itself: how can the classical features of the macroscopic world,
such as definite objects having definite locations, be accounted for by a theory
that extends quantum superpositions also to the macroscopic level via the
Schrödinger evolution? This is usually the point where a “standard realist
interpretation” of the quantum formalism is invoked.
To clarify what we mean by “standard realist interpretation”, let us first of
all consider the analysis of the measurement problem put forward in Maudlin
(1995). Maudlin casts the measurement problem in terms of the conceptual
tension among the following three statements: (a) quantum measurements
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always yield a unique definite result, (b) quantum states are information-
ally complete, and (c) the dynamics of the quantum states is encoded in
the Schrödinger equation. Under the light of this analysis, the first step in
providing a standard realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is to give
reasons to let go of one of the above statements. For example, Everettians
do away with (a), Bohmians reject (b), while GRW theorists deny (c).
The three mentioned interpretations are realist insofar as they maintain
a sui generis and robust notion of definiteness and objectivity. For example,
the de Broglie-Bohm theory and GRW theory can be associated to a view
in which the world is made up of an objective global arrangement of some-
thing with a definite location evolving in time.2 Instead, the Many Worlds
interpretation is compatible with the view that there objectively is a wave
function of the universe with a definite branching structure (cf. Wallace,
2012, chapter 3). Hence, there is a clear way to preserve standard realism
under the light of quantum physics: just acknowledge that the usual text-
book reading of the quantum formalism—that is, assuming a unitary phys-
ical evolution for (closed) quantum systems, plus a wave function collapse
upon measurement—is prone to the measurement problem, and subsequently
adopt a standard realist interpretation that solves it.
Is this the only way to be a realist with respect to quantum mechanics?
Many authors would answer this question in the negative. For these “non-
standard” realists, the notion of standard realist interpretation delineated
above perverts the true spirit of quantum mechanics in that it introduces an
“extra baggage” of physical and/or philosophical assumptions. For example,
according to Crull:
Historically, Bohmian mechanics and collapse interpretations were
developed precisely in order to explain the appearance of classi-
cal phenomena (definite outcomes being among these). [...] [I]f
one focuses on the specific problem of outcomes as the source
of the anxiety, then the same is true of these interpretations as
of many Everettian explanations: they supplement the standard
formalism in order to get answers. In the case of Everett, this sup-
plement is often philosophical but sometimes carries inescapable
2The way this may be implemented wildly varies in the literature. In the case of
the de Broglie-Bohm theory, for example, one might have material particles in ordinary
3-space plus quantum potential (Holland, 1993), material particles and a multi-field in 3-
space (Hubert and Romano, 2018), material particles in 3-space simpliciter (Goldstein and
Zanghì, 2013), or even a single world-particle and a local field in a 3N -dimensional space
(Albert, 1996). The important point is that each of these ontological pictures consists of
entities with definite and objective features.
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physical ramifications; in the case of Bohm and collapse inter-
pretations, one must certainly admit additional physics alongside
one’s philosophy, e.g., the quantum potential or a non-unitary col-
lapse mechanism. But if important theoretical work can be done
without going these extra steps in any given direction, don’t we
stand to gain from the sustained generality of such an approach?
(Crull, 2015a, pp. 1029-1030)
However, the question now arises as to how to consider quantum mechan-
ics as a guide to shape metaphysical realism, while at the same time rejecting
the standard realist interpretations (i.e., de Broglie-Bohm, GRW, and Many
Worlds). A possible solution may be to sidestep the need for a standard
realist interpretation by claiming that the measurement problem is not that
big of a problem, after all. Indeed, for Crull, thinking that the measurement
problem really is a problem betrays “[...] a deep discomfort with accepting
that quantum mechanics reveals a truly indeterministic world—a world that
does not contain a causal (or any other) story about the ‘choice’ of one ap-
proximately non superposed state over other approximately non-superposed
yet equiprobable states. If physics has taught us that the world is indeter-
minate, then an answer to the specific problem of outcomes might well lie
outside the scope of what is accessible or demonstrable.” (ibid., page 1027).
In the same vein, other authors like Časlav Brukner, go as far as claiming
that “the solution [to the measurement problem] lies in understanding that
‘facts’ can only exist relative to the observer.” (Brukner, 2017, p. 95). This
latter point is also hinted at in Rovelli (1996):
[T]he problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics has not
been fully disentangled. This unease, and the variety of interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics that it has generated, are some-
times denoted the “measurement problem.” [...] [T]his unease
may derive from [...] the concept of observer-independent state
of a system, or, equivalently, the concept of observer-independent
values of physical quantities.
(ibid., p. 1639)
Clearly, questioning the requirements of definiteness and objectivity un-
derlying standard realism is not enough to establish a different kind of meta-
physical realism in the image of quantum mechanics. In order to do so, it
is necessary to come up with a story about how the appearance of a classi-
cal world arises, which relies on the standard quantum formalism alone—i.e.
without the additional physical and philosophical baggage that the standard
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realist interpretations carry. This is the point where decoherence appears
in the debate (see, e.g., Crull, 2017, and references therein; Di Biagio and
Rovelli, 2021, section 1.2).
The goal of the present paper is to investigate the type of realism that best
suits the framework of decoherence taken at face value without postulating a
plurality of worlds, or additional hidden variables, or non-unitary dynamical
mechanisms. We will call this attitude “decoherence without interpretation”,
to highlight the fact that it consists of a much more conceptually minimal
realist take on the quantum formalism than the standard realist interpreta-
tions outlined above. We will firstly provide a very quick introduction to
decoherence and its relation to the measurement problem (section 2). Sec-
tions 3 and 4 will then focus on the relation between decoherence theory
and metaphysical realism under the light of the minimal ontic commitments
entailed by the “decoherence without interpretation” attitude.
2 A short guide to decoherence
Decoherence is the theory of open quantum systems, i.e., systems interacting
with each other and forming as a consequence new entangled states. Usually
the decoherence mechanism involves two “actors”, namely, a system and an
environment. In general, the environment is simply defined as the collection
of certain degrees of freedom that we decide to ignore in the description of
the system but that still have some effect for the behavior of that system.
Usual environments are, e.g., air molecules scattering off a table, or spinorial
degrees of freedom relative to the electron position. Decoherence is, then,
the physical effect one can measure on a subsystem of the total entangled
state, namely, the loss of coherence between relative states of the initial
superposition. With this respect, it is interesting to ask what is exactly
achieved by decoherence and to what extent it explains (or helps explaining)
the appearance of a determinate physical state at the macroscopic level.
2.1 Density matrices
In this section, we introduce the principal mathematical tool used by deco-
herence, that is, the density matrix. In decoherence theory, we are inter-
ested in the description of a subsystem of a larger entangled state (usually,
a macroscopic object entangled with the external environment). However,
in quantum mechanics, we cannot assign a state vector (or a wave function)
to such subsystems. Nevertheless, they can be described by a specific type
of density matrix, called reduced density matrix (RDM). Understanding the
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physical meaning of the RDM is thus essential to understand the physical
and philosophical implications of decoherence theory.
2.1.1 Pure state density matrix
Consider a quantum system represented by the pure state |ψ〉. The system
density matrix ρ̂ψ is, by definition, the projection operator into the state |ψ〉:
ρ̂ψ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| . (1)
Perhaps not surprisingly, the density matrix takes a particularly clear
meaning when expressed in the matrix form. For simplicity, we consider as
a pure state the superposition of two states : |ψ〉 = cα |α〉 + cβ |β〉, where
|α〉 and |β〉 are eigenstates of a given observable Ô, and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. The







The diagonal elements of the matrix represent the probabilities of finding
the system in the states, respectively, |α〉 or |β〉 if we perform a measure-
ment of the observable Ô.4 The off-diagonal elements of the matrix indicate,
instead, quantum interference between the two definite states |α〉 and |β〉.
The density matrix of a system is essentially a mathematical tool that de-
scribes all possible measurement outcomes and their probability distribution.
This is also intuitively indicated by the trace rule:5
Tr(ρ̂Ô) = 〈Ô〉 , (3)
which connects the mathematical procedure of the trace of the operators
ρ̂Ô with the physical concept of the mean value of the observable Ô.
2.1.2 Reduced density matrix
Finally, we consider the case in which the system is an entangled state of two
subsystems: |S〉 and |E〉:
|Ψ〉 = a |S1〉 |E1〉+ b |S2〉 |E2〉 . (4)
3 The form of the density matrix (2) is basis-dependent and it is always possible to find
a basis in which this matrix is diagonal. However, in most cases the bases that diagonalize
a pure-state density matrix are not associated with physically meaningful observables.
4Note that the probability distribution is always given by Born’s rule.
5See e.g. Schlosshauer (2007, pp. 35-36) for a derivation of this rule.
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This is the typical case in decoherence theory, where |S〉 is usually the
macroscopic system under analysis and |E〉 the “environment”, i.e. an ex-
ternal system interacting with S through a suitable interaction Hamiltonian
Hint, responsible for the entangled state between the two in the following
way:
|S1〉 |E〉
Hint→ |S1〉 |E1〉 , (5a)
|S2〉 |E〉
Hint→ |S2〉 |E2〉 . (5b)
In the entangled state (4), it is not possible to assign an individual state to
the subsystems |S〉 and |E〉. The only way to extract information about the
possible measurement outcomes of one subsystem (for example, the subsys-
tem S) is (i) to define a density matrix for this subsystem, and (ii) to compute
the mean value of the observable via the trace rule. The density matrix of
the subsystem of a larger entangled state is the RDM, and is computed by
tracing out the degrees of freedom external to the considered subsystem—
for example, by tracing out the “environmental” degrees of freedom of the
subsystem |E〉 if we are interested in the RDM of the subsystem |S〉. In the







As in the case of the pure state density matrix, the diagonal elements rep-
resent the probability of finding the subsystem S in the definite states |S1〉
or |S2〉 and the off-diagonal elements indicate quantum interference between
those states. Using the RDM we can finally compute the statistical distribu-
tion of all possible outcomes of a measurement performed on the subsystem
S:
Tr(ρ̂redS ÔS) = 〈ÔS〉 . (7)
We note that the RDM does not describe the physical state of the sub-
system, since this information is encoded in the state vector of the system
(however, this point may be controversial and it is not supported by den-
sity matrix realists, such as Anandan and Aharonov, 1999; Maroney, 2005;
Chen, 2018). After the interaction, the two initial systems S and E do not
possess anymore an individual state, but they are fused together in the new
entangled state |Ψ〉.
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2.2 The decoherence process
From (6), we note that if the relative environmental states are orthogonal:
〈Ei|Ej〉 = 0, (8)







Eq. (9) indicates that if we perform a local measurement on the subsystem
S, we do not detect quantum interference between the relative states |S1〉
and |S2〉. The loss of coherence between relative states of the subsystem due
to a continuous interaction with the environment is the decoherence process.6
A couple of remarks are in order at this point. First of all, the loss of
coherence entailed by the decoherence process is only local: the phase re-
lations between the relative states are still there, but “hidden” at the level
of the entangled state (i.e., the phase relations are not destroyed but “de-
localized”). Secondly, even if decoherence transforms the initial coherent
superposition into an incoherent (or improper) mixture of states, it remains
rather silent about the physical state of the newly formed subsystem, as we
cannot assign to it a state vector or a wave function (see Romano, 2021, for
a detailed discussion of this point). What decoherence certainly does, how-
ever, is to change the empirical predictions of measurements performed on
the subsystem of the entangled state. In fact, after the decoherence process,
it is impossible to detect quantum interference between relative states of the
substystem. And this is exactly what decoherence eventually achieves: it
makes subsystems look classical if we measure certain observables or prop-
erties on the subsystem. Think for example of the double-slit experiment
with an electron beam. If we perform the experiment in an isolated setting,
an interference pattern will eventually be formed on the screen. However, if
we let air molecules fill the space between slits and screen, the interference
pattern will disappear and the final distribution of dots on the screen will
be indistinguishable from the classical one because of the decoherence effect
induced by the air molecules. However, this does not mean that the electron
beam has become classical: in fact, we cannot assign definite trajectories to
the electrons.
6The diagonal form (9) achieved via environmental decoherence always selects physi-
cally relevant observables, contrary to the diagonalizations mentioned in footnote 3.
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2.3 The Schrödinger cat decohered
To make a concrete case, it may be useful to analyze the famous Schrödinger
cat paradox from the point of view of decoherence. Suppose that the state




where the states |AD〉 and |AND〉 represent, respectively, the “decayed” atom
and “not decayed” atom. Following the causal chain described by Schrödinger
(radioactive atom, Geiger counter, relais, hammer, poison, cat), the state of
the atom gets eventually entangled with the state of the cat in the box,
leading to the famous coherent superposition of “atom + cat” states:
|A,C〉 = 1√
2
|AD〉 |. . .〉 |CD〉+
1√
2
|AND〉 |. . .〉 |CA〉 , (11)
where the states |CD〉 and |CA〉 represent, respectively, the states of the “dead
cat” and “alive cat”.
Similarly to the generic system discussed in the previous section, this is
an entangled state of two subsystems, i.e., the subsystems “atom” and “cat”
(the states correlated with them in between can be ignored). We are now
free to consider one subsystem as the system of interest and the other as the
environment. Since we are interested in the behavior (and destiny) of the
cat, we decide to select the “atom” as the environment and the “cat” as the
system of interest.
If the relative states of the atom are orthogonal, i.e., 〈AD|AND〉 = 0, the





2 |CA〉 〈CA| , (12)
or, in the matrix form (with the two states “dead cat” and “alive cat” as








(13) tells us that, if we perform a measurement on the subsystem “cat”,
for example by opening the box and looking at the actual state of the animal,
we have probability 0.5 of seeing a definite “dead cat” state and probability
0.5 of seeing a definite “alive cat” state. However, these probabilities are
not epistemic, since the two components of (13) refer to an improper (non-
classical) mixture of states. That is, decoherence does not single out one of
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the components of the superposition. This means that the cat has not sud-
denly become a classical object: it is still a superposition of a definite “alive
cat” and a definite “dead cat”, even though we cannot detect interference
between these two states. This is basically the reason why decoherence does
not solve the measurement problem: it does not explain why we get to see
one particular outcome and not the other (cf. Adler, 2003, and references
therein).7 This is also the reason why it cannot explain (alone) the appear-
ance of the classical world, for the solution of the measurement problem is
a necessary condition to derive the appearance of macroscopic objects with
well-defined positions and well-defined classical properties. This means that
decoherence in and of itself cannot replace the physical and/or philosophical
extra baggage usually involved in reconciling quantum mechanics and scien-
tific realism. Therefore, those scientific realists who are not sympathetic to
the standard realist interpretations of quantum mechanics can at most sup-
ply a set of assumptions that is different—more minimal, if you want—than
those underlying these realist interpretations (more on this in sections 3 and
4), but they cannot just invoke decoherence disjointed from any interpretive
move whatsoever (this point is stressed in Vassallo and Esfeld, 2015, and
Romano, 2016).
3 Metaphysical Perspectives on Decoherence
In section 2.3, we have argued that the “decoherence without interpretation”
attitude still requires some interpretive move in order to be compatible with
scientific realism. So, how exactly one should read off ontological morals from
decoherence without resorting to any extra conceptual baggage required by
the standard realist interpretations?
The first step in this sense might be to argue that the RDM is not just
a computational tool, but should be granted ontological dignity. To this ex-
tent, one might point out that the very fact that the RDM gives us the right
probabilistic distributions of measurement outcomes entails that it captures
some underlying features of reality. Decoherence, then, would concern the
7In the literature, there is also a stronger objection to decoherence due to Okon and
Sudarsky (2016). In short, these authors claim that the decoherence program is circular
because it assumes the collapse postulate and the Born rule to make physical sense of the
diagonalization process (9). An analysis of Okon and Sudarsky’s argument falls outside
the scope of the present paper. For the time being, we note that we disagree with their
conclusion. As it is shown by the presentation above, all the tools of decoherence are
consistently used, and a circularity would emerge only if one assumed that the RDM is
able to provide one definite outcome—which is not how the RDM is standardly conceived
of.
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dynamical behavior of such features. This is clearly an extra philosophi-
cal assumption put on top of the formalism, since the decoherence formalism
alone does not treat the RDM on a par with a genuine quantum state. There-
fore, it is clear that “decoherence without interpretation” still is some sort
of non-standard, minimal realist interpretation of the quantum formalism.
But what are the features of reality captured by the RDM, according to this
minimal interpretation?
To answer this question, we should start by considering how the deco-
herence process impacts on the picture of reality of someone observing the
decohered system. Let’s consider two different observers in the cat’s scenario
described by the RDM given in (13). Assume that one of the observers—let’s
call him A—opens the box with the cat while being isolated in a room, with
the second observer—B—waiting outside. Now, for A the cat will be, say,
alive with certainty,8 while B would conclude that now the system is in a
superposition of cat alive with A seeing it alive and cat dead with A seeing
it dead. So one may ask: is the cat alive (as seen by A) or neither definitely
alive nor definitely dead (as described by B)? Worse still, if at this point
B enters the room, he has 0.5 probability of ending up seeing A observing
a dead cat. In short, it seems rather hard to come up with a coherent story
that reconciles the “reality” experienced by A with that experienced by B.
This issue is very-well known in the literature since the inception of quan-
tum mechanics (the “Wigner’s friend” thought experiment is probably the
most mentioned source in this sense, see Wigner, 1967). London and Bauer
(1983), for example, note that:9
“Objectively—that is, [for B], who consider[s] as “object” the
combined system [(box, A)]—the situation seems little changed
compared to what [he] just met when [he was] only considering
[the box]. The observer [A] has a completely different impression:
for him it is only the [box] which belong[s] to the external world,
to what he calls “objective”. He attributes to himself the right
to create his own objectivity [...] by declaring [...] “I see [a live
cat]”.
(ibid., pp. 251-252, emphasis in the original)
This leads them to conclude that:
8This may raise the legitimate suspicion that a collapse mechanism is at work in the
background. However, supporters of decoherence without interpretation would probably
reiterate that there is just no fact of the matter accounting for the appearance of a definite
outcome upon mesurement.
9We have slightly modified the wording of the passage (not its meaning) to fit our
example.
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In present physics the concept of “objectivity” is a little more
abstract than the classical idea of a material object. Is it not a
guarantee of “the objectivity” of an object that one can at least
formally attribute measurable properties to it in a continuous
manner even at times when it is not under observation? The
answer is No, as this new theory shows by its internal consistency
and by its impressive applications.
(ibid., p. 259)
More recently, Frauchiger and Renner (2018) and Brukner (2017) have
devised variations of the “Wigner’s friend” experiment in which a group of
observers measuring the very same quantum system gets mutually inconsis-
tent assignments of values to the measurement outcomes (see Healey, 2018
for a nice exposition and a critical discussion of these arguments).
What kind of metaphysical realism can possibly go with such a highly
non-objective characterization of reality? The answer, according to authors
like Dieks (2019) is pretty straightforward:10
Our proposed perspectival way out of this dilemma is to ascribe
more than one state to the same physical system. In the case
under discussion, with respect to [B], representing the outside
point of view, the contents of the laboratory room are correctly
described by an entangled pure state so that we should ascribe
improper mixtures (obtained by “partial tracing”) to the inside
observer [and the box]. But with respect to the inside observer
(or with respect to the [box] in the room) the [cat is definitely
alive (or dead)]. So the inside observer assigns a state to his
environment that appropriately reflects this definiteness.
(ibid., p. 56)
One might be tempted to identify Dieks’ notion of “perspective” with that
of “Everettian robust branch”. This would be misleading because the latter
notion refers to the different decoherent components of the RDM: In London
and Bauer’s experimental setup, this would translate into the fact that the
inside observer A splits into two copies, one observing the alive cat, and the
other observing the dead cat. For Dieks, instead, the two perspectives are
(i) that of the inside observer A, and (ii) that of the external observer B:
Both (i) and (ii) obtain in the same world, i.e., the observers do not split
into different copies of themselves.
10Again, we have slightly changed the passage to fit our cat example.
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Dieks’ account of London and Bauer’s thought experiment seems to point
in the direction of some sort of strong variant of perspectival realism. In a
nutshell, this strong position would accept that there is a mind-independent
reality while denying that such a reality is an all-encompassing state of affairs
which obtains independently of how it is observed. In the words of Evans
(2020):
My interest [...] is to explore the possibility of the potentially rad-
ical suggestion that perspectivalism can be extended to account
for a type of objectivity, a type of observer-independence, in sci-
ence, but where facts about scientifically modelled objects are
nonetheless indexed to an observer perspective. My motivation
is a recent set of claims from quantum foundations that quan-
tum mechanics rules out the possibility of “observer-independent
facts”.
(ibid., pp. 2-3)
Here we are using the “strong” designation to distinguish this kind of
perspectivism from the milder one advocated, e.g., in Giere (2006); Massimi
(2012). This milder brand of perspectival realism, in fact, represents a weak-
ening of the epistemic and semantic theses underlying scientific realism, but
it fully preserves the metaphysical thesis of standard realism as we have set
out in section 1. In other words, according to mild perspectival realism, even
though there is a mind-independent objective reality, there isn’t a unique
and objectively true scientific framework that grants full epistemic access to
it (see Creţu, 2020, section 1, for a concise statement along these lines).
The strong variant of perspectivism suggested by the above quotations
is instead a metaphysical thesis that radically departs from standard real-
ism: even though there is a mind-independent reality, such a reality is not
a coherent union of objective, that is, perspective-independent facts. This is
because a fact is “objective” only with respect to a given perspective, which
in turn implies that there is no all-encompassing picture of reality (a “God’s
eye” view of the world, so to speak).
Indeed, many other voices in the quantum foundations literature tend
to sweep realism towards this strong perspectival direction.11 For example,
Fuchs (2017) writes:
Since the advent of quantum theory [...] there has always been a
nagging pressure to insert a first-person perspective into the heart
11Among them, it is worth mentioning Bene and Dieks (2002), who however adopt a
modal interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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of physics. [The views acceding to this pressure] have lately been
termed “participatory realism” to emphasize that rather than re-
linquishing the idea of reality (as they are often accused of), they
are saying that reality is more than any third-person perspective
can capture.
(ibid., p. 113)
The umbrella term “participatory realism” collects all the realist and
single-world interpretational frameworks that rely on the assumption that,
in any given situation, there is no unique quantum state associated to a sys-
tem, but an observer-dependent plurality of them. Such a characterization
makes it crystal clear that participatory realism bears an essential perspecti-
val component with it. Three important examples: Glick (2021) has recently
argued that Qbism can be considered a perspectival normative realist stance;
Di Biagio and Rovelli (2021) defend the view that quantum mechanics is
fundamentally about relative facts, some of which become stable in light of
decoherence; Auffèves and Grangier (2019) frame quantum measurements as
the realization of a given definite value of the observable depending on the
measurement context.
We have finally got a clear metaphysical sense of the direction in which
philosophers who support decoherence without interpretation are heading
when they claim that we should conceive of the quantum reality as non-
classical. Simply speaking, their attitude nicely fits a conceptual frame-
work in which the picture of reality entailed by decoherence trades the usual
requirement of (global) objectivity for a perspective-indexed (or context-
indexed) type of objectivity.
It might be claimed that global objectivity is not really lost on this view,
but has just to be pragmatically interpreted as “intersubjective agreement”
(see, e.g., Freeman, 1973, for a discussion of this type of objectivity). That
is, when a sufficient number of observers agree on a given fact (e.g., regard-
ing a measurement outcome), then such a fact is objective for all practical
purposes. While such a move may be helpful in salvaging some conspicuous
aspects of epistemic and semantic objectivity, it cannot make up for a no-
tion of metaphysical objectivity because it does not concern the way things
are—it is in fact a pragmatic notion. Hence, it does not seem that invoking
intersubjective agreement can make the rejection of global objectivity a less
radical move.
Historically, the first attempt to define objectivity as a kind of intersub-
jective agreement about the state of a system in the context of decoherence
is due to Zurek (2009) through the approach called quantum Darwinism.
This approach starts from the notion of einselection, which amounts to the
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selection of pointer states by the environment. In a nutshell, einselection
describes which particular states of a system will survive the decoherence
process—the “survival of the fittest”. Einselection, however, does not select
a unique definite state (i.e., it does not get rid of the quantum superposi-
tion), so it provides no explanation as to why the system can yield a definite
measurement outcome recorded by many independent observers. According
to quantum Darwinism, this illusion of objectivity is due to the redundancy
of copies of certain relative states of the system in the environment. These
redundant—or, robust—states are those that do not change under the ac-
tion of the environment. As a consequence, they get entangled with many
relative states of the environment, thus forming a multitude of copies that
spread out in the surrounding environment. In other words, when a certain
state is robust, large “fragments” of the environment will spread the informa-
tion about this state: the observers will just intercept these fragments and
acquire information about the system. The more the information about the
system state via fragments is redundant in the surrounding environment, the
more the different observers will acquire information about the state with-
out destroying it (as the information is brought about by independent copies
of the environment). As the very same information about the decohered
state is transferred to the majority of the observers, that state—according
to Zurek—will become objective, in the sense that all observers will have a
consensus on the state of the system, despite the underlying superposition.
In Zurek’s words:
The proliferation of records allows information about [the system]
S to be extracted from many fragments of [the environment] E [...]
Thus, E acquires redundant records of S. Now, many observers
can find out the state of S independently, and without perturbing
it. This is how preferred states of S become objective. Objective
existence—hallmark of classicality—emerges from the quantum
substrate as a consequence of redundancy.
(ibid., p. 182)
In this way, quantum Darwinism accounts for objectivity as the inter-
subjective agreement about the system’s state. This is probably the first
explicit attempt to define a kind of participatory realism in the context of
standard decoherence to explain the (appearance of) stability, uniqueness
and classicality of the pointer states selected by the environment.12
12Quantum Darwinism is conceptually close to the strategy recently developed in Di Bi-
agio and Rovelli (2021), according to which decoherence tends to promote a restricted col-
lection of relative states to robust states, i.e. states that are equivalent for most observers.
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To sum up, taking decoherence at face value without resorting to a stan-
dard realist interpretation leads to a rejection of standard objectivity, which
has to be put on top of the withdrawal of ontic definiteness mentioned in
section 1. This obviously represents an extreme reshaping of the metaphys-
ical component of scientific realism. However, some may object that this
“decoherence-induced” perspectival drift of scientific realism can hardly be
called “scientific realism” anymore given that it either gives up or radically
revises (e.g. by making them perspective-dependent) the three theses on
which scientific realism is built (see, e.g., Chakravartty, 2010, for an attack
on perspectivism broadly construed). Here we are not interested in pursuing
this line of argument. Instead, we want to explore some conceptual conse-
quences of accepting this strong perspectival realism. This will be done in
the next section.
4 A further weakening of reality: decoher-
ence in cosmology
In section 2.3, after presenting the (“atom”,“cat”) entangled state (11), we
have mentioned the fact that we were quite free to choose which degrees of
freedom to trace out in order to construct a RDM for the subsystem of inter-
est. This is a simple example that vividly shows how the distinction between
system and environment is not strictly speaking built in the decoherence
process. In other words, in decoherence theory the division between certain
degrees of freedom that collectively we call the “system” and other degrees of
freedom that we call “the environment” has always a certain degree of arbi-
trariness.13 In standard cases, however, this choice is in some sense a “given”
to physicists for the simple reason that the decoherence process starts with
an interaction between two distinct systems initially unentangled (see (5)).
However, we want to argue that there is a point after which drawing
the system/environment distinction becomes so arbitrary to impact on the
(metaphysical) perspectives generated by the decoherence process. This
point of no return is marked by quantum cosmology.
An important caveat is in place before discussing the matter further: sim-
ply speaking, there is no well-established theory of quantum cosmology as
With this respect, Di Biagio and Rovelli’s strategy can be thought of as a refinement of
Zurek’s quantum Darwinism.
13The problem of individuating quantum subsystems was well-known even before the
decoherence formalism made its inception. For example, von Neumann (1955, chapter
VI), was one of the first to attempt at providing a characterization of the division between
measured system and measuring apparatus.
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yet. What we have instead is a (fractured) collection of physical models,
usually involving the framework of quantum field theory over a curved spa-
tiotemporal background, which aim to describe a number of aspects of the
origin and evolution of the universe that cannot be accounted for by classical
cosmology (which in turn is based on general relativity). In this sense, we
are not claiming that the considerations we made earlier about decoherence
smoothly carry over from standard, non-relativistic, quantum mechanics to
quantum cosmology: probably they will once a complete theory of quan-
tum cosmology will be established, but we are not there yet. That being
said, we anyway believe that (i) the results achieved so far in the context
of quantum cosmology, however partial they might be, are still physically
relevant enough to be investigated from a metaphysical perspective and (ii)
these results rely on a core conceptual framework which is shared with non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. For these reasons, we think that, even at
this stage of theoretical development, it makes a lot of sense to discuss how
a conceptual analysis of decoherence translates to the cosmological context.
Let us now focus on a concrete physical issue investigated in quantum
cosmology, which has been brought up several times in the philosophical
debate about decoherence mentioned earlier. This issue concerns the for-
mation and subsequent evolution of the material structures of the universe
from an early inflationary epoch, which left the universe in a homogeneous
and isotropic state. Roughly speaking, the question is: how did the “messy”
universe we observe at all scales pop out of the perfectly ordered one that
was left after the (hypothesized) sudden expanding phase physicists refer to
as “inflation”? This question is worth being asked because the inflationary
model of the universe is very valuable in that it is able to provide convincing
solutions to many problems that arise in classical cosmology. For example,
the highly ordered state of the universe after inflation explains the observed
homogeneity of the cosmic microwave background. Moreover, the quantum
fluctuations of the inhomogeneous terms of the inflaton field show a striking
similarity with the power spectrum of the observed density fluctuations that
can be traced back to the early stages of the universe’s expansion. Hence, it
makes sense to see what kind of story, if any, the inflationary model provides
for the origin and development of these so-called “seeds” of cosmic structure.
The following sketch is based on the presentation given in Perez et al. (2006,
section 2) and Kiefer and Polarski (2009), and it has no pretense of formal
rigor beyond that required to drive home our philosophical point.
The simplest model14 starts from a (classical) scalar field φ coupled to the
metrical field g of general relativity. φ is called the inflaton field because it
14In the following, we set c = G = ~ = 1.
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obeys some appropriate dynamic constraints, which assure that the universe
undergoes a sudden accelerated expansion in its early stages. The model
focuses on small perturbations δφ of the inflaton field while holding fixed
the spacetime geometry g, which hence acts as a background against which
these perturbations propagate. Usually, these perturbations are treated as a
sui generis scalar field y(x, t) = a(t)δφ(x), a(t) being the scale-factor of the
universe, which changes in cosmic time t. In the Big Bang scenario, a is a
monotonically increasing function such that a(0)=0. This new field is then





We can then exploit the resources of analytic mechanics to calculate the
momenta conjugate to these modes (we suppress the time dependence for
notational simplicity):




where a prime symbol indicates a derivative with respect to cosmic time.
The appropriate general relativistic action for the system under consid-







yk = 0, (16)
with k = |k|.
When this model is canonically quantized, both yk and pk are promoted
to operators, and from them, the annihilation and creation operators (âk and
â†k, respectively) can be defined in the usual way.
The initial vacuum state Ψ0(t0), i.e., the one such that âkΨ0(t0) = 0
for all k, corresponds to a quasi-Minkowski vacuum and, hence, is spatially
homogeneous and isotropic. It can be shown that Ψ0(t0) is the minimum
uncertainty wave packet, that is, a Gaussian state.
The quantum dynamical evolution of the model is such that, at the on-
set of inflation, the wavelengths of the fluctuations are much smaller than
the curvature scale (i.e., k2  a′′
a
). Soon, however, some wavelengths grow
much larger than the curvature scales and the corresponding modes become
“squeezed”. Roughly speaking, squeezing happens when pairs of particles
with opposite momenta are created. A squeezed mode corresponds to a
Wigner quasiprobability distribution over phase space which is basically
|Ψ0|2δ (pk − pcl(yk)), where pcl is the classical momentum conjugate to yk
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(see equation (15)). This means that the eigenvalues of yk corresponding to
squeezed modes follow Born’s rule as usual, but to each of them is associated
a definite value of the conjugate variable pk = pcl(yk). This is taken as a jus-
tification of the fact that the modes with wavelength such that k2  a′′
a
can
be considered equivalent to a statistical ensemble of classical fields. Once
this step is achieved, it is just a matter of mathematics to show that the
expectation values for these squeezed modes are equivalent to the averages
of classical random variables, from which it is possible to establish a link
between the “primordial” quantum fluctuations and the classically behaving
inhomogeneities observed in the cosmic microwave background (which are
the “seeds” of cosmic structure mentioned above).
Now it seems that we have been able to kill two birds with one stone,
namely, to provide a quantum-to-classical transition mechanism and to ex-
plain how a structured universe originated from the quantum fluctuations of
an early highly symmetric stage. However, it is too soon to cry victory. In
fact, the above treatment has focused on a small part of the whole quantum
state, i.e., squeezed modes, leaving conveniently aside all the other modes.
It is exactly at this point that the decoherence mechanism is invoked. Sim-
ply speaking, non-squeezed modes are regarded as negligible, and treated
as (part of) the “environment” to be traced away from the RDM that ac-
counts for the squeezed modes. But this begs the question as to what the
“source” of entanglement between different modes of the same quantum state
would be. The usual answer to this question is that a full quantum theory
of the inflaton field will be non-linear, which will lead to the entanglement
between modes corresponding to different wavelengths at different curvature
scales. Another possible answer would be to claim that such a full quantum
theory will feature other fields which might provide the environmental de-
grees of freedom needed for the decoherence mechanism to work. While both
of these proposals are a viable solution to make decoherence work in this
context as a computational tool, their implications from a scientific realist
perspective are equally challenging, as we are going to argue below.
To see this, we have to go back to the issue of the distinction between
system and environment. As we have said, in ordinary contexts the deco-
herence mechanism naturally induces a robust distinction between system
and environment. For example, in the Wigner’s friend scenario discussed in
section 3, observers A and B certainly agree that the main system under
investigation is a cat (although they disagree on the details of its physical
description). In the cosmological case, instead, the situation is much more
subtle. Indeed, in such a case, the system is the entire universe, which means
that the kind of evolution (5) is out of question because we do not have two
initially distinct pure states getting entangled as a consequence of a physical
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interaction: there is (in a tenseless sense) just a single quantum state of the
universe.15 Carroll and Singh (2020) nicely summarize this issue as follows:
If someone hands you two qubitsA andB, there is a well-understood
procedure for constructing the quantum description of the com-
posite system constructed from the two of them. If the individual
Hilbert spaces are HA ' C2 and HB ' C2, the composite Hilbert
space is given by the tensor product, H ' HA⊗HB ' C4, where
' represents isomorphism. The total Hamiltonian is the sum of
the two self-Hamiltonians, ĤA and ĤB, acting on HA and HB,
respectively, plus an appropriate interaction term, Ĥint, coupling
the two factors. What about the other way around? If someone
hands you a four-dimensional Hilbert space and a Hamiltonian, is
there a procedure by which we can factorize the system into the
tensor product of two qubits? In general there will be an infinite
number of possible factorizations [...] Is there some notion of the
“right” factorization for a given physical situation? In almost all
applications, these questions are begged rather than addressed.
(ibid., p. 3)
The standard way out of this issue, as we have seen in the case of the seeds
of cosmic structure, is to choose the decomposition of the “universe” system
in relevant and irrelevant degrees of freedom depending on computational
convenience, and show how the former decohere against the background of
the latter. But this immediately prompts a key question: What are the
metaphysical morals to be drawn from this move? Recalling what has been
said in the previous section, one may want to argue that, behind the freedom
to draw a line between system and environment in a cosmological context
lies a further perspectival layer of reality.
In the Wigner’s friend case, in fact, the perspectival move was grounded
in the claim that there is no objective fact of the matter about the cat’s
state, so each observer had its own perspective on that. By way of analogy,
one may argue that the fundamental system/environment arbitrariness at a
15An interesting analogy is drawn by Zeh (2006) between the case of quantum cos-
mology and the case of an atomic nucleus in nuclear physics. In both cases, a total
symmetric/homogeneous state can be (effectively) decomposed via decoherence into a su-
perposition of asymmetric/inhomogeneous states. In the example of the nucleus we have
different definite orientations in space, while the total state of the nucleus is perfectly
symmetric. The key insight that enables the analogy is that, in both cases, we deal with
closed systems, and hence the environment is composed of internal degrees of freedom.
This means that the effects of decoherence are seen from “the inside” of the system. We
thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention on this analogy.
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cosmic level implies that there is no fact of the matter whether there is a
unique division between system and environment and, hence, to each division
corresponds a different perspective. Bringing back the Wigner’s friend case,
now observers A and B may also disagree on what the main system is even if
they are interested in investigating the same physical situation (each of them
can “carve” the universe in a different way depending on their computational
needs). A moment of reflection, however, shows that this second perspectival
layer is quite puzzling if analyzed through the lenses of standard realism.
In fact, let’s assume that it is possible to apply a strong perspectival
realist reading to cosmological decoherence, and let’s go back to the infla-
tionary picture sketched above. We have said that decoherence explains how
the inhomogeneous seeds of cosmic structure popped out of an homogeneous
quantum state. Hence we can claim that, from our perspective, the inhomo-
geneous structure of the universe is real. However, also from our perspective,
we see that the cosmic background radiation is overwhelmingly homogeneous
and isotropic, and we explain it by invoking the symmetry of the universal
quantum state. Here there is a clear sense in which we speak about the “same
perspective”, namely, the fact that both observations are accounted for by
the same observers using the same cosmological model. However now we are
in a strange situation: from our very same perspective, it is true that the
universal quantum state is both symmetric and inhomogeneous. Basically we
let it undergo either the Schrödinger evolution or the non-unitary subsystem
dynamics encoded in the decoherence process depending on what feature of
our very same perspective we want to account for.
One may reply to this remark by pointing out that the total state was
symmetric before undergoing decoherence, but this is in stark tension with
the fact that the universe does not interact with anything outside itself: the
only thing that selects the inhomogeneous parts of the state at a later time
is us, and only for computational purposes. Recall from section 3 that a
perspective à la Dieks is associated to a certain quantum state, and that
a subsystem of a larger entangled state (formally represented by a RDM)
cannot be assigned a physical state (end of section 2.1.2). Hence, there is
no question whether we can consistently assign different perspectives in the
cosmological model under consideration.
In the end, it seems that the perspectival story applied to the system/environment
distinction becomes extremely radical (at least, from the standard realist
standpoint). Indeed, insisting on this story would mean claiming that mu-
tually inconsistent facts obtain from the same perspective. Note how the
strength of the above argument does not depend on the detailed form of
the quantum cosmological state or on the particular coupling mechanisms
underlying the decoherence process, but relies on a basic set of features of
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the model, i.e., closedness and global symmetry. From this point of view,
the situation arises whenever we consider decoherence happening “inside” a
closed system, that is, for situations in which the environment is composed
of internal degrees of freedom of the total system.
However, those who defend a literal metaphysical reading of decoherence
may retort by pointing out that there is no fact of the matter whether there is
a unique division between system and environment at the cosmological level
just because, in fact, there is no such thing as a system/environment divide
simpliciter. In this way, they would end up with an anti-realist attitude
towards the mereological structure of the world,16 which is summarized in
the following passage:
Ubiquitous and un controllable entanglement begets decoherence
which in turn creates further entanglement: the system and en-
vironment become a new inseparable composite with a new envi-
ronment to which it then becomes entangled, forming a new in-
separable composite interacting with a still different environment,
ad infinitum. The result is an upward cascade of entanglement
relations largely hidden from experience by decoherence. In such
a world there can be no material parts with true ontic grit. There
can be no in-principle physical joints for carving nature, because
any such joint is a mere specter whose existence and form depend
entirely upon the specifics of environmental interactions.17
(Crull, 2015b, p. 11)
Although this mereological anti-realist turn does not necessarily conflict
with the scientific practice, it renders the whole metaphysical stance asso-
ciated to decoherence even more radical. In fact, it demotes boxes, cats,
observers, and so on to “mere specters”. As a consequence, the mereological
anti-realist has to do much more conceptual work than the standard realist
in supplying a convincing story about why (i) it is physically meaningful to
perform experiments on subsystems of the universe and (ii) we can rely on
the conclusions drawn from these experiments in order to get a picture of the
world.
16See Cowling (2014), for a presentation and defense of mereological anti-realism. Note
that this position should not be confused with mereological nihilsm. This latter view
maintains that there are only mereological simples, but it does not deny that the world
possesses at least a weak mereological structure given by the whole/simples relation.
17This point is already present in Crull (2013, section 3, p. 881): “Decoherence also
ought to cure us of the notion that the world is truly divisible [...] One can slice the material
world in myriad ways and get away with it because those slices have no ontological grit
[...]”.
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To conclude, scientific realism has reached a crossroads. On the one
hand, we can assume that the standard formalism of quantum mechanics—
including decoherence theory—without any standard realist interpretation
provides a complete description of reality, and accept the cost of a strong form
of perspectival realism, possibly combined with mereological anti-realism. On
the other hand, we can maintain that quantum mechanics and decoherence
need a standard realist interpretation to provide a coherent story about the
physical world and hence accept the extra baggage of parallel worlds, hidden
variables, and objective collapses. We leave the final choice to the reader,
being content to note that in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics there
is definitely no free lunch.
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